Leseprobe

16 Because of their outstanding political, military and economic posi- tion in the world, it was, above all, the United States and the Soviet Union and, with far less authority, the United Kingdom that deter- mined, or at least influenced, the progress of developments—both in the states whose conditions had been made an issue at the con- ference and in the countries and regions which had not been the subject of negotiations. Further, there were discussions on the ongoing war in Asia, on how to end it as quickly as possible, and without heavy casualties among own forces, and how Japan should be forced to surrender unconditionally. For this purpose, the United States wanted the Soviet Union to enter the war. The Red Army was to tie Japanese troops in Manchuria and prevent them from defending Japan. On 26 July 1945, the heads of the United States, China and the United Kingdom declared their intention to deliver “the final blows” to Japan if it did not surrender. Otherwise they would be determined to exer- cise their military power, which would then entail “the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland”. 5 Before the opening of the conference, President Truman had received news that the test of the atomic bomb had been successful. And only shortly after its end, on 6 and 9 August 1945, the first—and to date only—atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively, with consequences previously unimaginable. Since then, human life and politics have been in the shadow of the nuclear threat. This collection of essays assesses the diversity of topics dis- cussed at the Potsdam Conference as well as their political signifi- cance for Europe after the war and still today. Its purpose is not to tell yet another story of the conference or how the change from active combat to the Cold War came about, since Herbert Feis, Robert Betzell, Charles L. Mee, Michael Dobbs and, most recently, Michael Neiberg (who takes his readers to the conference table, as it were) have already fully accomplished this task. 6 Neither does it primarily deal with Europe or the German question. These aspects, too, have been academically investigated and researched, by, among others, Herbert Kröger, Fritz Faust, Ernst Deuerlein and Michael Antoni. 7 What were the hopes and expectations that politics and the public at large associated with the Big Three’s conference at Pots- dam? To answer this question, it is important to recall the venue of the event and to look at the objectives pursued by the three victorious powers. What ideas did people in Europe and Asia have about the new era and the new order emerging after the long years of devastat- ing war? Did feelings of confidence and security return after the con- ference and the end of the war (for these two cannot be isolated from one another)? Did people take notice of the resolutions reached at Potsdam by a handful of politicians and, ultimately, by the Big Three alone? And, if so, did they perceive these decisions, in which they had had no say, as an opportunity for themselves and a better future?