Leseprobe

102 As this situation unfolded, the general populace grew increas- ingly war-weary, but not rebellious. The social democrat Jupp Kappius wrote to a comrade in January 1945: “The people are by and large tired of the war. The long working hours, the great distances that they now have to travel by foot, the shortage of supplies, etc. etc. But they’re simply tired of it, they only wish it away. Not just because no one wants to stick his neck out while there’s still someone around to bludgeon him for it, but also because no one knows what he could do, how he could do it, with whom (sic!) could do it and with what. And most of all, he doesn’t know why he should do something.” 7 External motivation was initially limited, since shelves were still stocked and hunger remained temporarily at bay. The Nazi regime ensured that bombed-out residents were well provided for; so well, in fact, that they kept their anger directed at those dropping the bombs. During the entire war, Germany’s leaders were able to maintain a much stronger civilian supply chain for food and other provisions than they had during the First World War. They also had significantly more success in this regard than the other major bellig- erents, the United States excepted—though this distinction can be chalked up to the fact that the Wehrmacht utterly plundered the areas it invaded. 8 The church also did its part for the war. In a pasto- ral letter from 1 February 1945, Archbishop of Freiburg Conrad Gröber called on his flock to “not at all question or undermine the martial, heroic struggle for our existence and our future ... The raging world war does not just demand from a Christian populace its fight- ers, who are ready to suffer and die for the people. It also demands from those at home, in ever greater amounts, the greatest sacrifice that a people can possibly offer.” 9 In fact, most Germans did not rescind their allegiance to Hitler and the Nazi regime until the very last minute, which is to say, until it was a matter of their livelihoods. And even this occurred only in places where the state apparatus was no longer capable of enforcing orders and decrees. 10 Otherwise, the over- whelming majority still viewed the Führer as the only salvation— “the last bastion and the last hope”, as it was worded in the final bulletin of the domestic intelligence agency. 11 Everyone bemoaned his or her own fate without bothering to take responsibility for it, placing all hope on Hitler instead. Meanwhile, those fates were beginning to look existentially threatened as the Third Reich haemorrhaged territory in the final months of the Second World War. During the war, Germany had systematically relocated its industries, including ones critical for producing civilian supplies, into conquered territory; as the fighting entered its end phase, this decision appeared increasingly disadvantageous. 12 Still, the widespread shortage of necessities that marked the final months of war was not a universal condition: though the regions that saw the most combat experienced gnawing hunger, there were other German prisoners of war at Aachen, October 1944